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Abstract
A theology of the infinite
The idea o f  the infinity o f  God has recently come under pressure due to the 
modern world-view, and due to the difficulty o f  proving the doctrine. How­
ever, the idea o f  the infinite, as qualitatively different from the merely very 
large, has properties which may be applied to some traditional difficulties 
in Christian theology, such as the ideas o f  the Trinity and the Incarnation, 
particularly in regard to the limitation and subordination o f  the Son. 
Predication o f  infinity to God may then make the doctrine o f  God more 
comprehensible and rational At the same time, however, this has implica­
tions fo r  the nature o f  God, particularly in his relation to the material and 
to time. Not to be overlooked is the value o f  the idea from a pastoral per­
spective.
1. Introduction
In traditional theologies regarding the nature o f God is found a statement o f the 
infinity o f God. This will usually be associated with positive statements about 
him, such as the ideas o f his omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. In­
deed, the idea o f  G od’s infinity is sometimes simply seen as a negative statement 
o f  what can be referred to in positive ways. God has all power, he is almighty; 
therefore his power is infinite. There is nowhere that it is possible to go to escape 
from God; therefore his presence is infinite.
2. T he basis o f  an idea o f infinity
Until recently, the idea o f  G od’s infinity was accepted without real question. 
W here the existence o f  God was accepted, it was not questioned but that he is 
infinite (Bolzano, 1950:84; Rucker, 1982:9 quoting Cantor). It was a common­
place throughout the Middle Ages, due no doubt to the strong influence o f Greek 
philosophy on the ideas o f that period. Interestingly, Aristotle rejected the as­
cription o f infinity to God on the basis that this would mean that God was unin­
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telligible (Sontag, 1962: 24). However Aquinas, despite following Aristotle in 
many ways, rejected this, and held that God is in fact infinite (Sontag, 1962:44). 
In more recent times, however, with a re-examination o f  so much that had been 
accepted almost without question, the idea o f G od’s infinity has also been 
doubted. In particular, the strong influence o f evolutionary ideas in every branch 
of thought, notably o f course in the theory o f natural selection in the development 
o f diverse biological species, has contributed to a suggestion that God, like every­
thing else, is in a state o f change (Gruenler, 1983: 11). Thus in distinction to the 
Greek and medieval ideas o f  a static fixed universe and a stable society, with the 
obvious changes in the world being superficial compared to the essential stability 
o f  the universe, came the idea that all is developing, including God himself. God 
is therefore not infinite, but developing in relation to a universe that is also devel­
oping. God is in ‘process’, and although he is greater than humanity, he is not 
absolutely so. Likewise, the ontological argument is meaningless; there is no 
such thing as absolute perfection. Some things are only better, bigger, stronger or 
whatever, than others. All is relative.
In the light o f  this suggestion, it is necessary to re-examine the basis on which 
God is stated as infinite.
2.1 Philosophical basis
This root o f the idea o f  infinity has already been alluded to in the reference to 
Greek philosophy. Augustine, “who adopted the Platonic philosophy to the 
Christian religion” (Rucker, 1982:3), thus believed that God is infinite. God is 
apart from the world, and different from it. Being very conscious o f  the limita­
tions o f humanity, people very naturally deny such limitations to deity. Thus 
Berkhof (1958:52) writes, “ ... we remove from our idea o f  God all the imperfec­
tions seen in His creatures, as inconsistent with the idea o f  a Perfect Being, and 
ascribe to Him the opposite perfection” . Although Berkhof (1958:53) rejects a 
philosophical basis for the knowledge o f God as “ ... on human conclusions rather 
than on the self-revelation o f  God in His divine W ord”, he does assume the per­
fection o f God. Then if perfection is predicated o f  God, it would seem to follow 
that God is infinite (Sontag, 1962: 68).
2.2 Psychological basis
Related to this category is the deep desire within the human personality for the 
existence o f  an infinite being, for such a being provides a basis for security. If 
God is not o f  infinite power, there may always be the feeling that the particular 
problem o f the moment is actually too great for him. In the Athens o f  Paul’s day 
(Acts 17:23), the erection o f  an altar to the ‘unknown god’ was to ensure that 
every area o f  life was adequately protected by deity.
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O f course, the desire for protection leads to the accusation that God is simply a 
reflection o f human need, and even that he does not exist at all. Belief in a god is 
simply a result o f a desire for someone able to meet human problems, as Feuer­
bach suggested. This is essentially Descartes’ view; for him the appreciation of 
his finitude could only be explained in relation to the existence o f  the infinite (cf. 
Farrer, 1959:14). An interesting variation on this is to attempt to predicate infi­
nite potential to human beings (as in the New Age movement), but then it be­
comes problematic to differentiate them from a possible God (cf. Bohler, 
1991:39), who is then effectively ‘infinitely infinite’.
2.3 Biblical basis
Several texts may be suggested which support the idea o f the omnipresence of 
God, such as in the prayer o f  Solomon at the consecration o f the Jerusalem Tem­
ple:
Behold, heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain thee; how much less 
this house which I have built. (1 Ki. 8:27 cf also Is. 66:1, Ac. 7:49.)
Similar to this is the claim o f omniscience, such that God knows everything (Jer. 
23: 24; cf. also Ps. 139:If).
Such claims may indeed be valid, but unless the universe is looked upon as infi­
nite, this is not in fact a claim to infinity, but rather to being everywhere, which is 
not at all the same thing.
Perhaps more relevant are texts such as Mark 14:36, “Father, all things are pos­
sible to you” or Genesis 18:14, “Is anything too hard for the Lord?” Again how­
ever, these do not actually demand omnipotence.
2.4 Causal basis
A similar objection can be made against the idea that creation demands infinite 
power, so that God must be infinite. This is true if the universe is infinite, giving 
rise to a problem felt by both Augustine and Aquinas, who believed it to be im­
possible for an infinite to create an infinite (Kennedy, 1991:46). However, the 
infinity o f  the actual universe is doubtful; in this case, whereas it is clear that 
creation requires a very large amount o f power indeed, this is not the same as in­
finite power, but could, at least in theory, be calculated.
Further to this is the suggestion that the world may well not be created, but could 
be eternal, or perhaps that spontaneous creation could be a normal feature of the 
universe (Davies, 1983:26, 215).
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3. The idea o f  the infinite
To a greater or lesser degree, such thinking is based upon an idea o f God as very 
large. Such size or ability or even perfection is beyond human comprehension, 
but really only because o f the limited ability o f the human mind to understand 
such ideas.
However, the term infinite does not simply mean a size greater than can be con­
ceived of, but means, as is the literal rendering o f  the word, something without a 
limit. This does not mean that the limit is so far beyond human reckoning that it 
may be understood as limitless, but that there really are no limits at all (Bolzano, 
1950:81 f.). Neither o f  course does the infinite simply mean something without 
an end. There are several non-infinites which have this property, such as the cir­
cumference o f a circle (Bolzano, 1950:83) or perhaps more interestingly, o f  a 
Móbius strip (Maor, 1987:139).' Other things are bounded and yet infinite, such 
as the space between two parallel lines (Bolzano, 1950:83). This understanding 
o f infinite is o f a qualitative difference from that o f the merely very large and so 
has unique properties, well known in mathematics. M aor (1987:16) refers to a 
“ googol”, ten to the power o f hundred, and a “googolplex,” ten to the power o f  a 
googol, numbers that are completely beyond comprehension, bigger even than the 
number o f atoms in the universe. He then remarks, “Big as these numbers are, 
they have nothing to do with infinity. In fact infinity is as remote from a googol 
as from 1” . Then he adds, significantly, “it follows that infinity is not a number at 
all, but a concept.”
This means that the properties o f the infinite will not be the same as those o f  the 
finite that we are used to. Our experience is only o f  the finite, “they never tran­
scend to the infinite” (Maor, 1987:58). There is a qualitative difference.
An example o f this is described in Sondheimer and Rogerson (1981:149). They 
use the example o f the infinite set o f positive integers. Here every number can be 
paired with members o f  a set o f even numbers; thus 1 is paired with 2, 2 with 4, 3 
with 6, and so on. As the series are both infinite, no numbers are left in either set. 
They contain the same number o f  elements. However, the set o f  all integers must 
contain odd numbers, so it should have double the number as in the set o f just the 
even numbers. Thus the paradox, which only applies as both sets are infinite, is 
that a set with twice the number o f elements has exactly the same number. Twice 
infinity equals infinity (Kline, 1954:396). In the words o f  Sondheimer and 
Rogerson (1981:149):
A continuous loop with a half twist. This then has only one side and one edge.
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An infinite set can be ‘put into one-to-one correspondence’ with a proper 
sub-set of itself. This is a general property of infinite sets which is not pos­
sessed by any finite se t ... .
It is a property such as this which can only belong to the idea o f infinity.2 It is not 
a property o f the simply very large, even o f things larger than can actually be 
conceived of.
4. T he existence o f the infinite
It is relatively easy to conceive of an infinite and to describe its properties. This 
does not, however, mean that such a thing actually exists. Particularly in mathe­
matics it is quite in order to describe, and to work with concepts which do not in 
fact exist in the physical world. An example of this is space with more dimen­
sions than the three that we experience. It must be noted, however, that mathe­
matical concepts are developed in general because they have use; even if they do 
not have actual existence, they do have actual application.
An example o f this, related to the idea o f the infinite, occurs in the theory of the 
infinitesimal calculus. This theory depends on the idea o f infinitesimally small 
quantities, which approach non-existence, or zero. Now, if one o f these is di­
vided by another, the answer is not zero (as when a zero is divided by a number) 
or infinity (as when a number is divided by zero), but in the limit, where each ap­
proaches zero, the answer is indeterminate. The theory o f calculus has proved to 
be an indispensible tool in mathematics, with enormous application in engineer­
ing. It is a concept which can be used, but it does not in fact depend on the actual 
existence on any o f its infinitesimals.
Rucker (1982:9) has helpfully discussed the idea o f infinity and divided the pos­
sibilities into three: a fully independent absolute other-worldly being, real occur­
rences in the physical world, and conceptions as in mathematics.
As regards the second, the possibilities are that physical quantities are infinite in 
extent, or that they are infinitely divisible. Although it would seem at first sight 
that space and time are infinite, this would seem to be unlikely. In the case of 
space, Einstein’s understanding would lead to a finite but unbounded universe 
because o f  the essentially curved nature o f space (Maor, 1987:220). He also 
stressed the limiting parameter o f the speed o f light in the known universe 
(Gruenler, 1983:75).
Incidentally, this answers the problem of God’s ability to create an infinite universe, as an 
infinite can encompass another infinite This is not to say that the universe is infinite, but 
the idea of creation docs not preclude the possibility.
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The concept o f entropy3 indicates that time cannot be infinite, even if it can be 
very long. Eventually the interaction o f matter results in a uniform chaos in 
which there is no meaningful change and therefore no time. The reality o f  unidi­
rectional change in the world leads to the necessity o f a real origin and real con­
clusion for this world, so a ‘big bang’ (Rucker, 1982:12) as origin, and either an 
indefinite expansion in total chaos or a ‘big stop’ when everything contracts again 
after expansion to a limit. In the second case there is a possibility o f  an infinite 
repetition o f the expansion-contraction cycle.4 However, this universe is limited 
in time.
The infinite divisibility o f space and time seems more practicable. It was in this 
sense only that Aristotle accepted the possibility o f  the infinite (Sontag, 1962:44). 
However, the atomic view o f  matter and the quantum understanding o f energy 
would indicate the lack o f  infinite divisibility. Even if  modem atomic physics has 
succeeded in going beyond the atom, there is no indication o f  absolute divisibil­
ity. From another perspective, when two things become infinitesimally close, 
they actually become one. They are no longer different (Rucker, 1982:31, refer­
ring also to Hume’s insights).
It would seem probable that any form o f infinity is impossible in the real world. 
Rucker (1982:51) however concludes:
There are, however, no conclusive proofs that everything is finite, and the 
question of whether or not anything infinite exists remains as an open, al­
most empirical problem ... There are various sorts o f physical infinites that 
could actually exist ... Each of these infinites is, in principle, avoidable; 
whether or not our Cosmos does actually avoid infinities remains to be 
seen.
However, whether or not infinites do exist, they can certainly be conceived of, 
and then their properties can be described. For this we are indebted particularly 
to George Cantor (1845-1918), who put the mathematics o f  the infinite on a 
sound footing and described several o f  the properties o f  the infinite (Maor,
All real events in the universe are essentially irreversible; it is impossible to restore the 
universe to exactly the same state as before. The second law of thermodynamics indicates 
that overall, any process results in a measure of order being lost, so of an increase in 
chaos; entropy quantifies this process, so is constantly increasing.
The concept of entropy does not demand the existence of a creator, although that is 
perhaps the simplest explanation. It is possible, in theory, to explain even the observed 
increase in entropy in terms of initial natural events which produce a low entropy system, 
or perhaps in terms of continual creation or destruction of entropy (Davies, 1983:212).
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1987:53f). Although Cantor believed that the existence o f irrational numbers5 
shows that the infinite actually exists, he admitted that it is largely a thought 
process, actual existence being irrelevant to the values o f the concepts (Maor, 
1987:54,62).
Thus, although it is impossible to divide a real thing into an infinite number of 
parts, there is no objection to conceiving o f such, and neither is there a fundamen­
tal reason why these infinitesimals could not be perceived. The Heisenberg un­
certainty principle6 reflects on human inability (at least witli current technology), 
or perhaps more exactly, on human finitude. Neither is an infinite distance or 
time fundamentally impossible; it is real physical infinites which are questioned. 
Aristotle, in Physics wrote, “the infinite has a potential existence ... there will not 
be an actual infinite” (Maor, 1987:54).
My concern is with the nature o f God. Rucker (1982:51) writes, "... once one 
has an infinite Absolute, one must also have many conceivable infinites as well” . 
It is interesting that here, as also in the case o f Bolzano (1950:101) and else­
where, it is the acceptance o f God as infinite which adds weight to the argument 
for the existence o f other infinites. The existence o f God, and his nature o f infin­
ity is, however, simply accepted dogmatically as a presupposition. It cannot be 
proved, simply because o f its own nature.7
If God is infinite, this immediately means that God is different from the world and 
from humanity (Sontag, 1962:48). He is distinct, and although He may relate to 
the world and to humanity, there must always be a qualitative difference; God 
must be beyond time and space (Gruenler, 1983:76). It is for this reason that 
Aquinas rejected the possibility o f the infinite in the physical world. He accepted 
that God is infinite, and wanted to preserve a distinction between the world and 
God (Rucker, 1982:49).
It is well known that numbers can not all be expressed exactly. Naturally some are, such 
as the integers (I, 2, 3 etc.), but some are not, but are expressed in repeating decimals 
(such as 0,333 ...). This latter case is not real indeterminability but is because we use a 
number system based on 10. In other systems exactness is possible, so that 0,333 is 
exactly one third Nevertheless other numbers arc ‘irrational’, such as the square root of 2, 
n (the ratio of a circumference of a circle to its diameter), and e (the base of natural 
logarithms), and cannot be expressed exactly in any number system. In our normal 
decimal system they are expressed only as infinite scries.
It is impossible to determine everything about very small particles The very act of 
attempting to do so changes their situation.
This aspect has implications for the Ontological Argument, which depends on the definition 
of God as pcrfect. This aspect requires a measure of comparability, whereas an infinity 
cannot be compared bccausc it is indeterminate.
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5. A pplication to Christian theology
Although it is impossible to prove that God is infinite by any of the ways that 
have been suggested, predicating infinity of God enables an explanation of a 
number of features in Christian theology which are otherwise difficult to under­
stand. Its ability to do this would thus strongly indicate that God is infinite. The 
idea of Aristotle is turned around; whereas he denied infinity to God so that he 
could be known, God is actually better understood just because he is infinite. 
Whereas the concept of very large (such as a googol) is incomprehensible, an in­
finity is in fact better defined. It is fully compatible with rationality (Sontag, 
1962:77). Whereas some of the statements of Christian theology have led to a 
rejection of Christianity because they are perceived as incomprehensible and even 
contradictory, their explanation in terms of the understanding of the nature of the 
infinite should lead to a greater acceptance of the faith (Kennedy, 1991:38).
This seeming paradox can be illustrated by the repeated tossing of coins. Each 
toss gives an unpredictable result, but overall, if a large number of tosses is per­
formed, the result is effectively predictable. The use of an effective infinite en­
ables accurate determination. This is o f course the basis of the insurance indus­
try, where although individual accidents are unpredictable, overall their occur­
rences can be predicted with great accuracy, enabling the risks and consequent 
premiums to be known.
This is not an absolute infinite, but a very large. The infinite is indeterminate, but 
the large is sufficiently close as to be usable, just as irrational numbers can only 
be given a practicable numerical value by approximation.8 The point is that a 
limitation is essential because the infinite is unmanageable. Similarly of course, if 
God is to relate to us, He must limit himself; a full expression cannot be appreci­
ated by a limited humanity. Then it follows that the degree of self-limitation de­
pends in the particular context. As infinite, God cannot be fully described in hu­
man terms; He is different, but it is possible to relate to him.
Real infinities can, however, be conceived of, described and used. Various 
quantities in mathematics, such as the irrational numbers (Maor, 1987:45), can be 
described in terms of infinite series, some of which can be summed. In these 
cases the determination is exact, but the definition involves infinity (Bolzano, 
1950:93). It is impossible to write down the entire series, even if it can be con­
ceptualized.
Thus the Biblical value of n (1 Ki 7:23) given as three, is not an error; in fact all given 
values are approximate to some degree, the only difference being the degree of 
approximation.
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A further example of this is the Koch curve (Maor, 1987:78)9 which has the inter­
esting property of an infinite perimeter, and in fact an infinite distance between 
any two points when following the perimeter, no matter how close they are. Yet 
the area enclosed by it is finite (Davies, 1983:15). In all these cases we have fini- 
tude and infinity in one figure. There is a combination of the incomprehensible with 
the comprehensible. Theologically, a parallel to this is that God is immanent, relat­
ing to the world and humanity, but at the same time differently transcendent. (See 
Maor, 1987:83 f. for some further examples combining the finite and infinite.)
In these cases, the use of the infinite renders understandable an otherwise incom­
prehensible. This would be true of God. We can say what He must be like, but 
can never exactly comprehend what we mean! By means of the infinite, his na­
ture can be defined, but never exactly explained.
5.1 God as Trinity
The dogmatic assertion that God is not an undifferentiated monad but is one God 
in three persons, however that is then understood, is distinctive to Christianity. 
Obviously the basic idea comes from the realization of the divinity of Christ, 
based on his own assertions and observation of his life and deeds, and then sub­
sequently on a realization of the divinity of the Holy Spirit. It is highly significant 
that this assertion took place in a religious culture that was emphatically mono­
theistic. The experience of Israel, particularly in exile, had led to a fear of any­
thing approaching plurality in deity. This does not mean that simple monotheism 
is all that is to be found in the Old Testament; there are indications of plurality, 
such as the expression “let us make ...” of Genesis 1:26, but these are minor, and 
without a reading back of Trinitarianism, would not be seen as leading to it. Ba­
sically, the message of the Old Testament is that of monotheism. This contrasts 
strongly to a Greek culture which was very ready to ascribe deity due to the ex­
perience of anything surprising or miraculous, as Paul and Bamabas found at 
Lystra (Acts 11:12). These experiences were of course recorded in the Bible, and 
it was the attempts to reconcile the various assertions in the Bible which eventu­
ally led, by means of the Trinitarian controversies, especially that associated with 
the name of Arius, to the developed doctrine as understood today.
With the growth of Biblical criticism, the doctrine of the Trinity has come under 
attack as a dogmatic invention which cannot really be deduced Biblically. If the 
Bible is viewed as containing much later material, especially as influenced by
This is generated by starting with an equilateral triangle. At the centre of each face is 
placcd an equilateral triangle with each side a third of the original length. (This gives a 
‘star of David’ .) The process is repeated on each face of the new figure, and then again on 
the figure then generated, and so ad infinitum.
Koers 60(1) 1995:103-120 111
A theology o f the infinite
Greek ideas, if it only contains a collection of disparate theologies, and especially 
if it is not to be seen as a valid revelation in its own right but a witness to religion, 
the doctrine of the Trinity rests on a very flimsy foundation. Attempts of such as 
Barth and Augustine to suggest a second root for the Trinity, the so-called Ves­
tigia Trinitatis, are readily conceded to be weak.
The attack on the Trinity is of course strengthened by the difficulty of the doc­
trine, and by its irrelevance to practical Christian life and devotion. It can be 
suggested that Christianity can be a lot more credible, and so acceptable to mod­
em humanity without it, and that Christianity would lose little.
It must, however, be observed that the doctrine not only explains the Biblical 
data, but does explain a number of other theological problems which do then oc­
cur in non-Trinitarian monotheism such as Islam and Judaism. For example, if 
God is love, how could this be possible before the creation of the world? Trini- 
tarianism sees a solution in the inter-Trinitarian love between the Persons. Nev­
ertheless, these are not great advantages compared to the difficulty of under­
standing how God can be at the same time singular and plural. Yet, if this can be 
explained satisfactorily, the Trinitarian solutions to other problems become 
meaningful. In this respect a perception of God’s infinity is helpful.
If each person is infinite, the persons together are not three times the individual 
but exactly the same. Each person alone is no smaller than the group but is equal. 
Equally, they are really distinct, and not identical.10 This is not the same as Ter- 
tullian’s suggestion of the unity that exists in a committee comprised of individu­
als, and is also more than that of Hodgson’s social Trinity, which will both see 
the group as really more than the individuals. Here the very nature of the infinite 
means that the sum is exactly that of each individual person, and that each person 
alone is totally God, equal to the sum of the persons.
5.2 God as incarnate
A problem that immediately arises on ascription of deity to Jesus Christ, is how it 
is possible that God can be contained in a human frame. God is immense, and a 
human frame is so small. Thus, as already cited, when Solomon built the temple, 
in his dedicatory prayer he said that it was impossible for it to contain God, see­
ing that heaven itself could not contain him (1 Ki. 8:27). Jesus himself, in the 
later temple, referred to his own body as the temple (Jn. 2:21). The same thing is 
true; if a built temple could not adequately house God, then neither could a hu­
man body.
Infinite sets can be easily defined to be mutually exclusive, such as the sets of all even 
numbers, and of all odd numbers. They arc absolutely equal, yet different.
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Therefore in references to the presence of God in the Old Testament temple, the 
language has a connotation of the “glory” of the Lord (e.g. Ez. 11:23), or of a 
symbol such as a cloud. And yet the implication is always of a real presence of 
God, such as when Ezekiel spoke to the Lord in that same temple, and certainly 
the implication of the New Testament is that Jesus did not simply represent God, 
but really was God.
Such is again possible if God is infinite. A very large being could not possibly be 
incarnated, yet a being without limits can be. There is no question of compress­
ing, or taking a part to represent a whole, but the entire person of God was in 
Christ. He is limitless, and so the limits of a human body are simply irrelevant. 
Although Aristotle could not reconcile infinity witli form, later thought had no 
difficulty in so doing (Sontag, 1962:101). This is not a matter of reconciling two 
‘natures’, one finite and one infinite, but of recognizing that a single being may be 
both.
Incidentally, the acceptance of humanity in incarnation is not the same as an in­
herent identification with the material. Pantheism, which identifies God with the 
material, is impossible if God is infinite, for the simple reason that the material is 
inherently limited, even if it is immense." There are suggestions that the universe 
is infinite, but this must be impossible due to the nature of the material. Rather 
modem suggestions are that there is some form of continuous creation, or that the 
universe is expanding from some primeval ‘big bang’. Both of these imply a very 
definite limitation to the material.
Naturally a rejection of an identification of God with the material universe does 
not mean that God is not involved in the universe both as creator and as sustainer. 
He can be seen as in everything, even as its ‘ground of being’, but is infinitely 
greater than the sum of everything.
5.3 God as limited
Philippians 2:7 has occasioned an enormous amount of attention in relation to the 
incarnation, especially with the suggestion that in order to be incarnate, the Son 
of God emptied himself in order to be less than divine. Such could be seen as an 
explanation of the incarnation and of such features of the ignorance of Jesus as to 
the date of the second coming (Mk. 13:32). It is, however, obvious that there 
was a limitation in the incarnation; the infinite is incomprehensible. When con­
fronted with the glory of God by the river Chebar, Ezekiel sat overwhelmed for
God could incamatc as a universe, but not identify with it.
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seven days (Ez. 3:15). When John saw the glory of the risen Christ on the island 
ofPatmos, he “fell at his feet as though dead” (Rev. 1:17).
Yet the discussion on the kenotic theory of the incarnation led to a reaffirmation 
of a full incarnation. The Son of God incarnate was not less in nature than as not 
incarnate. The incarnation was real. Nevertheless, there was a self-limitation, a 
self-restriction in order to relate to humanity.
Such a self-limitation should not in fact be surprising, as God limited himself in 
the creation, and especially in the creation of humanity. In order to give real free 
will, and in order to give real authority to the created, as the idea of the image of 
God (Gen. 1:26) should most likely be taken to mean, God limited himself, even 
if temporarily. When something is given to another, even if it is o f an intangible 
nature such as power, the giver is naturally diminished by the amount given.
Although a self-limitation is not an inherent limitation of the power and authority 
of God, it may still be seen as unacceptable, both as involving change in God and 
as reflecting upon his absolute nature. However, if God is seen as infinite, with 
infinite power and authority, humanity can still be given real free will, power and 
authority, but God is in no way diminished by the gift. He still has infinite power; 
his authority over humanity is not at all lessened but is infinitely more than that of 
humanity. What is restricted is God’s freedom, which is only absolute due to his 
infinity (Sontag, 1962:137); but to voluntarily restrict freedom is not an inherent 
limitation.
Traditional theologies have had difficulty with reconciling an essential unchange­
ability in God with Biblical references to his repentance, as well as to the facts of 
creation and incarnation. Whereas one solution is to see the essential idea of im­
mutability not ir. a Platonic immobility where any change was rejected as it would 
involve a move away from perfection, but in consistency, reliability or faithful­
ness. However, insofar as an infinity can change and still remain infinite, God 
may be immutable just because he is infinite (Sontag, 1962:46).
To put it another way, limitation can be seen as consistent with infinity. To give 
a mathematical example, a series of even numbers by definition is limited; it does 
not include any odd numbers, yet it is still infinite (Bohler, 1991:38).
5.4 The subordination o f the Son
A similar problem is that of the clear subordination of Jesus, focused in the 
statement of John 14:28 “the Father is greater than I”. This is a key text for the 
argument of the ancient Arians, and in the modem world the Jehovah’s Wit­
nesses, with their understanding of the Son as inherently less than God the Father, 
so implying a polytheism, a loss of the unity of God.
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It is possible to explain this text in terms of the fact that at the time of speaking, 
Jesus was self-limiting his nature. He was less than the Father, but only then, as 
the context may suggest, and was anticipating a restoration of his glory after his 
death. Such reasoning would, however, be unlikely in the case of John 10:29-30 
where the greatness of the Father is again referred to, but with the immediate 
claim of Jesus -  “I and the Father are one”.
Alternatively, it can be explained in terms of relation, a view that as the Son, Je­
sus must be less than the source of his being, the Father, even if they are essen­
tially equal. A human father and son are equal as regards humanity, but there is 
still a relational difference.
A more satisfactory way is to recognize that both Father and Son are infinite. 
Therefore of course they are absolutely equal, but also each is less than the other, 
even infinitely so. Any infinite is greater, even infinitely greater, than any other 
infinite. Thus the Son can say that the Father is greater than He, but at the same 
time He remains equal. As Rucker (1982:6) says, “the attributes ‘equal’, 
‘greater’ and Mess’, are not applicable to infinite, but only to finite quantities” .
5.5 The death of God
One other peculiarity of the infinite is that infinity minus infinity is not zero as 
might be expected, but is indeterminate (Maor, 1987:8). This of course follows 
from the fact that adding anything to infinity, even another infinity, does not in­
crease it. This can be suggested to have an application to the cross of Christ 
where God died. The absolute outrageousness of this has caused some in the past 
to reject it by suggesting that only the human nature in Christ died or that he only 
appeared to die. Nevertheless, the real death is essential if it is to be an adequate 
sacrifice for sin.
The objections have been largely based in the Greek idea of the impassibility of 
God who cannot suffer or change in any way. This view naturally led to a dual­
ism both in God and in humanity. More to the point is the idea that death dimin­
ished God, with implications for his ability to care for the world. However, as 
God is infinite, a real diminishing in his death does not in fact diminish him.
5.6 The perception of God
If God is limited, he can never, or very rarely, have a single experience of the 
whole of reality. The alternative is a fragmented God. Gruenler (1983:130) 
therefore has suggested that infinity is the only way of safeguarding the unity of
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God (cf. also Sontag, 1962:138). It can also provide a solution to the question of 
the perception and involvement of God in time.12
In any process of change, it is possible to conceive of an infinite number of states: 
there are an infinite number of instants in any period. This must be so to avoid 
the paradoxes which will otherwise occur. Kline (1954:403) refers to the prob­
lem of the flight of an arrow to illustrate this. At any instant its position can be 
identified, but at the next instant it is in a different position. Unless the next in­
stant is infinitesimally close to the previous one, the arrow must be simultane­
ously at rest and in motion.
Mathematically the paradox is that speed is distance divided by time. In an in­
stantaneous change, the distance moved is zero, and as zero divided by anything 
is zero, the speed is zero. However, the time between instants is also zero, and 
anything divided by zero is infinite; thus the speed between two positions is in­
finite. The paradox is resolved in that zero divided by zero (or zero multiplied by 
infinity) is any quantity whatsoever. Thus the speed is neither infinite nor zero. 
Clearly this is only valid where the gap between two positions is infinitesimal, 
where there is an infinite number of states between the original and final posi­
tions.
Now where there are an infinite number of instants in a finite period, or of posi­
tions in a finite distance, it follows that it does not matter how big that finite pe­
riod or distance is, there is still a one-to-one correspondence between the instants 
or positions in that period or distance with those of any other period or distance, 
no matter how big or small that period or distance is (Kline, 1954:402). Putting it 
crudely, no matter how big or small a period of time, or a length of space, it will 
contain the same number of instants or positions; that number is o f course infinite.
What has this to do with the nature of God as infinite? The point is one of per­
ception, for a finite mind or ability to perceive can obviously not observe every 
instant of time or position in space. Indeed it does not need to; Kline (1954:404) 
points out that the illusion of motion in a film is satisfied by the projection of a 
number of still pictures, or instants, on to a screen in succession. This number 
does not in fact need to be very high. Kline mentions a figure of sixteen per sec­
ond, but any number of that order will be adequate, as long as it is not too low, 
when the illusion of motion is lost to be replaced by that of a series o f still pic­
tures, which is in fact the truth.
It is notoriously difficult to understand what time is. Perhaps the best is to see it as a 
description of the changes which take place compared to the changes in something else 
(Bolzano, 1950:131). Such a proccss of change can be seen as a succession of states 
following one another.
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Now this will be true of the human perception of anything at all. It will be of a 
rapidly changing sequence of impressions, a definitely finite, and quite a low 
number, in any period of time. Thus a human being does not perceive everything, 
but only what occurs in those instants. Anything else, such as when the person 
blinks, is just not observed; that perception is lost because the person is in time. 
This is not true for God, who will observe everything. In any case, God is eternal 
and is effectively outside of time.13 To put it in another way, a human being ob­
serves by means of a finite number of impressions in any period, God by an infi­
nite number. Unlike human perception, that o f God is total; he is omniscient.14
There is a couple of results which follow from this observation. The first is, to 
me, a matter of speculation. It is frequently remarked by people who are getting 
older that the days seem shorter than in their youth and that they cannot get so 
much done. Time seems to be speeding up. Surely the problem would be that the 
number of perceptions is decreasing with age, there are less per unit of time. 
(This point is not relevant to this article, but is perhaps of further interest.)
The second, more importantly for theology, follows from the fact that God per­
ceives an infinite number of instants in any period of real time. Because of the 
one to one correspondence of these instants with those of any other period, the 
length of time becomes irrelevant. In any period, God’s perceptions are of an 
equal (infinite) number. Thus it is possible that with the Lord one day is as a 
thousand years, and a thousand years as one day (2 Pet. 3:8).
This is not simply a dogmatic assertion to explain the delay in the parousia, the 
second coming of Christ, the ‘day of the Lord’, but is firmly based on the nature 
of the infinite. (It may perhaps be suggested here that such a time difference 
between God’s perception and that of the world can be explained by the relativity
To say that God is everlasting is not adequate as it predicates the idea of time onto God; 
thus implying that time is infinite. If time is a measure of change, it is only meaningful 
where the material changes, which is not the case when entropy maximizes in the chaos of 
the end of the universe, and is questionable before the initial event of the universe.
To say that God is eternal is then to put him outside of time but that just as God is 
involved with the material, he is then able to interact with time. Not that He alters it, as 
that would limit the free will of people and affect the consequences of that free will, but it 
means that God's action has eternal effects.
An example of this is the efficacy of the atonement for the whole of time. Since it is an 
eternal act, it is effective for sins committed before the historical event, and also after the 
event. Of course as it is the infinite Christ who died, it is also effective for any amount of 
sin; there is no limitation.
This docs not demand determinism. God’s perception is of all events, both actual and 
possible.
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theory in terms of the change in time experienced by a moving body (Gruenler, 
1983:104), so that if God were moving at close to the speed of light, one day for 
him would be as a thousand years, but this would not explain the other half, one 
thousand years as a day, and certainly not at the same time.)
6. The im plication o f  infinity
Any investigation of ‘real’ theology, the nature of God, must face the accusation 
of irrelevance to practical issues of Christian life and experience. Yet the appli­
cation of religion must be based on an understanding of what deity is like. While 
theology is rooted in experience of what God has said and done, at the same time 
an appreciation of theology clarifies and enables experience. Here a realization 
of God’s infinity has several consequences.
Very obviously a God of infinite power is more trustworthy than one of limited 
power, even if that power is large beyond actual comprehension.
Less obviously, but a point repeatedly stressed by Gruenler (1983:16) is that a 
non-infinite God cannot have a full, simultaneous perception of the whole of real­
ity, especially due to the inherent limitation of the speed of light. Such a God 
cannot know everything at once, and so cannot respond to need.
While process theology is reacting against the ‘immobility’ of classical theism 
(Gruenler, 1983:14) by stressing the involvement of God in the world, such a God 
cannot be totally involved. In ordinary life, the greater an official, the harder it is 
to gain access. Such a person is too important to be concerned with every indi­
vidual. Yet the glory of God’s infinity is that he is so great that he can be con­
cerned with everything. Technically this does not need infinity, but taken in 
conjunction with the previous point it does.
Perhaps the most significant implication of God’s infinity concerns the relation­
ship of believers to God. If deity is by nature infinite, then it is impossible for a 
limited human being to become divine, whether in the sense of the primeval 
temptation (Gen. 3:5) or in the modem versions as expressed in prosperity 
teaching or the New Age movement. While the infinite may accept limitation, the 
finite cannot become infinite. This stands in contrast to the Christian teaching of 
the adoption of believers as children of God (Rom. 8:15, Gal. 4:5). A Christian is 
not divinized, but benefits by a relationship to God. ‘In Christ’ is not absorption, 
but relation. It must be pointed out here that a view of God as personal, that is 
being able to relate, by no means reflects on his infinity, but actually the contrary.
In addition, human life can in no way be eternal by nature, as humanity is finite. 
Only God is inherently eternal (1 Tim. 6:16). Thus the only way of receiving 
eternal life is by relation to God, through adoption.
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Seeing God as infinite and so unique also stands in contrast to the common hu­
man attitudes of treating resources as if they were infinite. Human beings also 
tend to feel that they are naturally immortal. At the same time, of course, there is 
a resistance to admitting dependence on God; rather than accepting life as a gift 
from a gracious God, there is usually the attempt to seek to earn it. An apprecia­
tion of the infinite distance between humanity and God would go far to overcome 
these temptations.
7. Conclusion
Several years ago, J.B. Philipps, one of the pioneers in putting the Bible into 
simple language and so at least partly responsible for the glut of modern transla­
tions, wrote a little book entitled Your G od is too small, in which he bemoaned 
the fact of the poverty of much that passes for religion, attributing it in part to a 
poor view of God. Certainly this continues to be true, exacerbated by increasing 
technical ability which encourages a belief in human solutions. This would be 
particularly true of South Africa which is increasingly inward looking due to the 
enormity of its problems.
And yet the continued inability of humanity to solve its problems, whether techni­
cal or political, should give rise to a new appreciation of human finitude, with 
then at the same time a longing for the infinite (Sinkler, 1989:79). A feeling of 
humility should lead to a desire for God’s solutions.
Could it be that an investigation of the infinite does not lead only to the solution 
to problems in theology, but be the key to human problems as well?
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